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BANK PRIVATIZATION IN VIETNAM: EXAMINING
CHANGES TO MANAGEMENT IN VIETNAM’S NEW
BANKING LAW, DECREE NO. 59/2009/ND-CP
George B. Radics †
Abstract: Due to its WTO obligations, by 2010 Vietnam must open its banking
system to the world. As a result, the nation attempted to drastically modernize its state
owned banks through partial privatization. This partial privatization, locally translated as
equitization, proposed serious challenges to the existing legal infrastructure facilitating
banks. To cope with these new challenges, in September 2009, Vietnam’s new banking
law, Decree 59/2009/ND-CP, was passed. An important change in the new banking law
is its stricter regulation on the qualifications of managers. It is suspected that such
regulation signals the nation’s resistance to surrender control over its banks and commit
to reforms. The new banking law also further relies on the problematic Penal Code and
the Criminal Procedure Code. Faulty Penal and Criminal Procedure Codes can lead to
fraudulent lawsuits and managers losing their positions. In spite of its problems, the new
banking law is workable and a step in the right direction. By relying on existing
management laws, as opposed to those introduced by the new banking law, and
upgrading the Penal and Criminal Procedure Codes, many of the potential problems
created by the new banking law can be resolved.

I.

INTRODUCTION

In May of 2002, Kim Brix Andersen, a Danish national, left his job as
a vice-president at the largest bank in Singapore to help manage the foreign
funds of a quarry project in Vietnam.1 The quarry project was established by
two British nationals, Peter Laking and Sean McCormack.2 In mid-2002,
two Irish investors suspected Laking and McCormack of selling their shares
in the project without their knowledge. The two Irishmen lodged a civil
claim against Laking and McCormack in the High Court of London and a
complaint against them with the Vietnamese public security ministry in
Vietnam.3 Although the case was dropped in the British High Courts for
lack of evidence, the Vietnamese government continued to investigate the
†
Juris Doctor expected in 2010, University of Washington School of Law. B.A., University of
California, Los Angeles; Ph.D., National University of Singapore. The author would like to thank
Professor Jane Winn at the University of Washington School of Law and the editorial staff of the Pacific
Rim Law & Policy Journal for their guidance throughout the writing process.
1
Denmark Summons Vietnamese Ambassador Over Banker’s Case, BBC MONITORING EUROPE,
Jan. 24, 2005, available at LEXIS, The BBC Monitoring Europe File [hereinafter Denmark Summons
Vietnamese Ambassador].
2
Fair Trials International, Peter Laking-Vietnam: Update as of June 2007,
http://www.fairtrials.net/index.php/cases/spotlight/peter_laking/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2009) [hereinafter
Fair Trials International].
3
Id.
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case for three months.4 Laking and McCormack fled Vietnam in May 2003
after supposedly experiencing harassment from employees of the Irish
investors and the Vietnamese government.5 When Laking returned in May
2004, he was arrested in Ho Chi Minh City.6 He joined Andersen and Tom
Hong, an American investor associated with the company, in prison.
Andersen was alleged to have helped the two embezzle $6.5 million USD
since the time he was put in charge of foreign funds. 7 Vietnamese
newspapers alleged that the project for which they worked was a multimillion dollar scam, set up as a false company used to swindle money from
foreign investors.8 Andersen, after intervention by the Danish ambassador,
was released in January 2005 due to lack of evidence against him, after 15
months of being incarcerated.9 Laking has been out on bail since July 31,
2007.10 According to Fair Trials International, Laking is still awaiting trial
while prosecutors attempt to build a case.11
As Vietnam attempts to enter the world market, it must strike a
balance between welcoming foreign investment and management, while still
maintaining control over the internal workings of the banks.12 As seen in the
Andersen case,13 investment opportunities are luring high-ranking managers
to the country. The case also shows that in attempts to control these
managers, the Vietnamese government is willing to go to extreme lengths to
investigate a case against them, even if this means depriving an individual of
his or her position in a company and/or procedural rights. This situation
becomes more complicated as more industries begin to welcome foreign
investment. Due to obligations under the World Trade Organization,
4

Id.
Id.
6
Rosemary Hannan, Haughey’s Lawyer ‘Was the Victim of Vietnam Scam,’ SUNDAY TIMES
(London), July 16, 2005, available at LEXIS, Sunday Times (London) File.
7
UK, US Citizens to Stand Trial for Decades-Long Mining Scams, THAN NIEN NEWS, Mar. 21,
2006, http://www.thanhniennews.com/overseas/?catid=12&newsid=13708 (last visited Jan. 25, 2010).
8
Prosecution Proposed for Three Foreigners, THE SAIGON TIMES DAILY, July 2, 2004, available at
2004 WLNR 11975828.
9
Denmark Summons Vietnamese Ambassador, supra note 1.
10
Ben Bland, Briton in Kafka-esque Ordeal, DAILY TELEGRAPH (Britain), Feb. 13, 2009,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/2813138/Briton-in-Kafka-esque-Vietnam-ordeal.html (last
visited Jan. 25, 2010).
11
Fair Trials International, supra note 2.
12
See Andrew Lam, New Year, Old Unresolved Passion: Vietnam and its Diaspora, NEW AMERICA
MEDIA, Feb. 7, 2008, http://news.newamericamedia.org/news/view_article.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2010).
In the article, the author uses the term “double-edged sword” to refer to the influx of investment and ideas
from Vietnamese Overseas, or “Viet Kieu.” The term also applies well to all Vietnamese sectors
experiencing an influx of foreign ideas.
13
Throughout this comment, this situation will be referred to as a “case,” even though the lawsuit
was dismissed at the trial court level in the UK and, because the lack of evidence, the case is still being
prepared for trial in Vietnam.
5
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Vietnam must “equitize” its banks in order to prepare the nation for the
influx of foreign capital.14 Equitization, or the process of selling off shares
in state-owned enterprises, proposes to modernize Vietnamese state-owned
banks.15 Equitization also proposes the introduction of a cadre of forward
thinking and entrepreneurial managers.16 In addressing this issue, and the
general inadequacy of the old banking law to deal with the newly equitized
banks, in September 2009, the State Bank of Vietnam released Decree
59/2009/ND-CP, (“New Banking Law”). 17 This comment argues that the
New Banking Law takes a heavy-handed approach in controlling the influx
of new managers by creating stricter regulations for management and more
opportunity for the government to remove managers arbitrarily.
Vietnam’s New Banking Law increases the government’s authority to
intervene and remove managers from their positions because it heightens
qualification requirements for managers, creates more situations in which
managers can be removed on the basis of past activities, and enhances
reliance on the problematic Penal Code and Criminal Procedure Code. This
comment will demonstrate how the New Banking Law contains stricter
regulation on the qualifications of managers compared to the other two laws
regulating Vietnamese banks: Law No. 60/2005/QH11 (“Enterprise Law”)18
and Law No. 02/1997/QH10 (“Law on Credit Institutions”).19 Moreover, as
can be seen in the Andersen case, even if the stricter qualifications and
extended prohibitions against managers are remedied, problems with the
Penal Code and Criminal Procedure create significant problems with due
process, making it easy for the state to remove managers from their position.
This comment argues, therefore, that instead of relying on management
regulations introduced by the New Banking Law, management regulations
already found in existing banking regulations, such as those in the Enterprise
Law, should be used, while loopholes in the Penal and Criminal Procedure
Codes should be critically examined.

14

Working Party on the Accession of Viet Nam, Schedule CLX- Vietnam: Part II – Schedule of
Specific Commitments in Services, 40, WT/ACC/VCM/48/Add.2 (Oct. 27, 2006), available at
http://docsonline.wto.org/imrd/directdoc.asp?DDFDocuments/t/wt/acc/vnm48a2.doc.
15
See TUYET TREES, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, VIETNAM: BANKING AND FINANCIAL SECTOR 1
(2008), http://www.buyusa.gov/arkansas/vietbank09.pdf (last visited Jan. 25, 2010).
16
Such a move is not unprecedented. China introduced new and foreign managers into its state
owned enterprises in order to modernize them. See Andrew Sargeant & Stephen Frankel, Managing People
in China: Perceptions of Expatriate Managers, 33 J.WORLD BUS. 17, 19 (1998).
17
New Law on the Organization and Operation of Commercial Banks, 2009, 59/2009/ND-CP
(Viet.).
18
Law on Enterprises, 2005, No. 60/2005/QH11 (Viet.).
19
Law on Credit Institutions, 1997, No. 02/1997/QH10 (Viet.) (amended 2004).
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Section II of this comment provides a background to the proposed
changes and will introduce the New Banking Law, the Enterprise Law, and
the Law on Credit Institutions. Section III analyzes potential problems
inherent in the New Banking Law including conflicts with existing laws and
its reliance on a problematic Penal Code and Criminal Procedure Code.
Finally, section IV provides potential solutions to the problems found in the
New Banking Law.
II.

PROFESSIONALIZING MANAGEMENT THROUGH EQUITIZATION IS
NECESSARY BUT MUST NOT CONFLICT WITH THE VIETNAMESE
BANKING LAW INFRASTRUCTURE

This section provides a background to the proposed changes, and will
introduce the New Banking Law, the Enterprise Law and the Law on Credit
Institutions. It will start off with a discussion on the significance of
management to professionalizing Vietnamese banks and then will discuss the
New Banking Law and how it conflicts with the Enterprise Law and the Law
on Credit Institutions, the two laws that help provide the legal infrastructure
to banking in Vietnam.
A.

Addressing Management Issues Through Equitization Will
Professionalize Vietnamese Banks

In a regulated economy dominated by state owned enterprises, such as
Vietnam, managers typically have weaker incentives to maximize efficiency
and profits.20 This is because “incentives for efficient management are weak
if managers are appointed on the basis of political decisions rather than
professional capacity, and if salaries and job security are not related to
economic performance.”21 On the other hand, due to preferential treatment
from the state with regards to land, export quotas, and tax treatment,
privileges of this kind have created substantial rents for the State Owned
Enterprises (“SOE”), leading to an entrenched cadre of managers and
employees. 22 These managers and employees have in certain cases
complicated governmental attempts to evaluate the performance and assets
of companies.23 In addition, global market forces, the U.S. Government, and
20
Frederik Sjöholm, State Owned Enterprises and Equitization in Vietnam 6, (Stockholm School of
Economics, Working Paper No. 228, 2006), http://swopec.hhs.se/eijswp/papers/eijswp0228.pdf (last visited
Feb. 5, 2010).
21
Id.
22
Vu Quoc Ngu, SOE Equitization in Vietnam: Experiences, Achievements, and Challenges, in S.E.
ASIAN AFFAIRS, 327, 330 (2003).
23
Id. at 330-32.
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international agencies are placing pressure on individual firms and the
Vietnamese Government to increase transparency and to open up many
protected industries and enterprises.24
With these factors in mind, the Vietnamese government continues on
its campaign to privatize its SOEs to modernize and professionalize their
business practices.25 Approaching the process cautiously, some authors have
argued that Vietnam adopted a gradualist approach to privatizing, or
“equitizing” its SOEs.26 Equitization is the dissolution, restructuring, and
privatization process of many formerly state-owned monopolies. 27 It
liberalizes both internal and external trade regimes, and encourages private
(both domestic and foreign) investment in the economy.28
Equitization in Vietnam was first initiated in 1992. 29 Small and
medium enterprises were part of the first wave of equitized firms.30 From
1992 to 1998, just seventeen SOEs completed equitization formalities. 31
“Equitization picked up momentum in 1999 and 2000 so that by September
2001 some 700 state enterprises had reportedly completed equitization
proceedings.”32 It is reported that from 2003 to 2004, this number had risen
to 1,292.33 Furthermore, while initially small and medium sized enterprises
were equitized, now larger SOEs, such as Vietnam’s state-owned banks, are
also making the change.
Today, external obligations are forcing Vietnam to open up its banking
system to the world. In 2001, the country signed a Bilateral Free Trade
Agreement with the United States requiring that by 2010, U.S. banks be
allowed to enter the country on equal footing with local banks.34 In 1995,
Vietnam promised to join the ASEAN Free Trade Area and reform its local

24
See Martin Painter, The Politics of Economic Restructuring in Vietnam: The Case of State-owned
Enterprise ‘Reform.’ 25 CONTEMP. S.E. ASIA 1, 32-33 (2003).
25
See Sjöholm, supra note 20, at 15.
26
See Painter, supra note 24, at 24; Sjöholm, supra note 20, at 2.
27
Vu Thanh Tu Anh, Policy Brief No. 33: Vietnam – The Long Road to Equitization, 3-4 (The
William Davidson Institute: Univ. of Michigan, 2005).
28
Id.
29
Martin Gainsborough, Slow, Quick, Quick: Assessing Equitization and Enterprise Performance
Prospects in Vietnam, 19 J. COMMUNIST STUD. & TRANS. POL. 49, 50 (2003).
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
Truong Dong Loc, Nguyen Huu Dang & Nguyen Van Ngan, Equitization and Firm Performance:
The Case of Vietnam 18 (E. ASIAN DEV. NETWORK, Working Paper No. 32, 2007),
http://www.eadn.org/truongdongloc.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2010).
34
Agreement Between the United States of America and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam on Trade
Relations,
U.S.-Vietnam,
Jul.
13,
2000,
Hein’s
No.
KAV
5968,
available
at
http://www.usvtc.org/trade/bta/US-VN-BTA.pdf.
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banking sector to correspond to international standards by 2012.35 As part of
the entrance requirements into the World Trade Organization (“WTO”),
Vietnam shored up its reforms in the banking sector to prepare its industries
for entry into a globally competitive market.36 Therefore, in addition to the
need to modernize its banks for national development, these global
obligations imposed by the WTO place further pressure on the Vietnamese
government to modernize and retrofit its banks.
In September 2009, the New Banking Law took effect.37 The New
Banking Law plays a very important role in upgrading and professionalizing
the banking sector in Vietnam. According to the State Bank of Vietnam, the
New Banking Law is meant to govern the organization, administration,
management, and operation of banks. 38 It will also help the Vietnamese
commercial banking sector improve its organizational structure and
operations to meet the needs for development and international integration.39
B.

The New Banking Law Must Not Conflict with the Enterprises Law
and the Law on Credit Institutions

Apart from the New Banking Law, Vietnamese banks operate in
conjunction with two other important laws. These laws are the Enterprise
Law40 and the Law on Credit Institutions.41 The New Banking Law must
therefore achieve its valuable task of preparing the nation for global
competitiveness while not interfering with these important existing laws.

35
ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) is a trade bloc agreement by the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations supporting local manufacturing in all ASEAN countries. Association of Southeast Asian Nations,
Protocol for the Accession of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam to the Agreement on the Common
Effective Preferential Tariff Scheme for the ASEAN Free Trade Area, Dec. 15, 1995, available at
http://www.aseansec.org/12372.htm.
36
See TREES, supra note 15.
37
See Newsletter No. 03, VCFO, (VIETNAM CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICERS CLUB, HANOI, VIET.), Aug.
5, 2009, http://www.cfo.vn/cfolib/uploads/VCFO%20News/VCFO_Newsletter_August09.pdf (last visited
Jan.28, 2010).
38
State Bank of Vietnam, Tin Tuc Su Kien: Toa Dam lay y kien Du thao Nghi dinh to chuc, quan tri
va hoat done cua NHTM. [Discussion Opinions: Draft Decree Organization, Management, and Operation
of Commercial Banks] (Feb. 10, 2007), http://www.sbv.gov.vn/vn/home/tinHDNH.jsp?tin=2409 (last
visited Jan. 19, 2009).
39
Viet Stock Financial Information, Monthly Information on Banking Activities: July (Aug. 13,
2009), http://vietstock.com.vn/Tianyonen/Index.aspx?ArticleID=76179&ChannelID=37 (last visited Aug.
12, 2009).
40
Law on Enterprises, 2005, No. 60/2005/QH11 (Viet.).
41
Law on Credit Institutions, 1997, No. 02/1997/QH10 (Viet.) (amended 2004).
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The Enterprise Law Protects Businesses from Governmental
Intervention

The Enterprise Law of 2005 sets forth provisions on the
establishment, organizational management, and operation of limited liability
companies, share-holding companies, partnerships, and sole-proprietorships
belonging to all economic components.42 Passed in 2005, and effective as of
July 1, 2006, the law “is intended to apply equally to domestic and foreign
invested enterprises.”43
The Enterprise Law applies to Vietnamese banks since according to
the law, an enterprise is an “economic organization that has its own name,
assets, stable office and is duly constituted for the purpose of conducting
business.”44 The Enterprise Law also enables the state to supervise, inspect,
and handle violations of national law by enterprises.45 Although the New
Banking Law creates additional requirements to which banks must abide,
these requirements must not conflict with the Enterprise Law, which protects
enterprises from governmental intervention.46
2.

The Law on Credit Institutions Creates a Level Playing Field and
Prevents Preferential Treatment

The Law on Credit Institutions governs “the organization and
operation of credit institutions and banking activities conducted by other
organizations.”47 The law, which was passed by the National Assembly on
June 15, 2004, aims to make capital markets run effectively, satisfy the
demand for capital from businesses, and keep up with economic changes in
the global economy.48 When it was drafted, the Law on Credit Institutions
was meant to “create a level playing field for all credit institutions and
prevent preferential treatment.”49
Currently, it is rumored that the state bank is drafting new legislation
to replace the Law on Credit Institutions and create a more efficient
42

Law on Enterprises, 2005, No. 60/2005/QH11, art. 1 (Viet.).
Memorandum from Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, LLP on Vietnam’s New Investment Law
(Mar. 2006), http://www.freshfields.com/publications/pdfs/2006/14675.pdf (last visited Jan. 25, 2010).
44
Law on Enterprises, 2005, No. 60/2005/QH11, art. 4(1) (Viet.).
45
Id. art. 161(1-5).
46
Id.
47
Law on Credit Institutions, 1997, No. 02/1997/QH10 (Viet.) (amended 2004). “Other institutions”
refers to non-state actors.
48
Vietnamese Law Consultants, Amendments to Law on Credit Institutions (Oct. 2005),
http://vietnamese-law-consultancy.com/english/content/browse.php (last visited Jan. 25, 2010).
49
Mergers of Viet Nam's Credit Institutions Regulated, ASIA NEWS NETWORK, May 26, 2009,
http://www.asianewsnet.net/news.php?id=5922&sec=2 (last visited Jan. 25, 2010).
43
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regulatory framework.50 Yet talks of this new Law on Credit Institutions
have not led to specific dates as to when the law will emerge. This poses a
problem since the existing Law on Credit Institutions contains clauses that
conflict with the New Banking Law.
3.

The New Banking Law Facilitates Vietnam’s Development Needs by
Professionalizing the Nation’s Banks

Drafted by the State Bank of Vietnam, the New Banking Law is
designed to supersede Decree No. 49/2000/ND-CP, 51 the former banking
law.52 The New Banking Law is intended to apply to all commercial banks,
including SOEs, joint stock banks, joint venture banks, and banks with one
hundred percent foreign capital.53 It also, for the first time ever, provides for
the use of the term “bank,” stating that only organizations granted licenses
under the Law on Credit Institutions or permitted by the State Bank of
Vietnam, can be referred to as banks.54 Defining the term “bank” is the first
critical step in streamlining control over the banking sector by the New
Banking Law, the Law on Credit Institutions, and the Enterprise Law.
The New Banking Law must also serve several, very important
functions. First, it should enable all Vietnamese state-owned banks to
equitize by 2010, the deadline by which Vietnam must equitize due to its
agreement with the WTO.55 Second, it must provide the guidelines private
investors must abide by when buying into state-owned banks. Last, these
changes should bring the industry up to international standards. All three of
these changes are necessary to support Vietnam’s development in the years
50
Spreading Out the Credit, VFR (Vietnam Financial Review, Hanoi, Viet.), May 23, 2008), at 1,
http://www.nri.co.jp/english/opinion/vfr/06SpreadingOut.pdf (last visited Jan. 25, 2010).
51
Organization and Operation of Commercial Banks, 2000, 49/2000/ND-CP (Viet.), amended by
New Law on the Organization and Operation of Commercial Banks, 2009, 59/2009/ND-CP (Viet.).
52
ASIA-PACIFIC ECON. COOPERATION (APEC), ELECTRONIC INDIVIDUAL ACTION PLAN, UPDATE FOR
VIET NAM FOR 2009 (2009), http://www.apec-iap.org/document/VN_2009_IAP.htm (last visited Mar. 28,
2010).
53
New Law on the Organization and Operation of Commercial Banks, 2009, 59/2009/ND-CP, art. 1
(Viet.).
54
State Bank to Detail Rules on Commercial Banks, 13 VIET. L. AND LEGAL FORUM 156, 24 (2007).
55
Xinhua, Vietnam to Finish Bank Equitization by 2010, PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE, Dec. 5, 2005,
http://english.people.com.cn/200512/05/eng20051205_225706.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2010). By 2010,
Vietnam is required to receive foreign banks on equal footing with local banks. This places pressure on the
nation to equitize its state-owned banks. Therefore, although Vietnam is not obligated to equitize all its
state-owned banks by 2010, there is strong pressure to do so by then. See Working Party on the Accession
of Viet Nam, Schedule CLX- Vietnam: Part II – Schedule of Specific Commitments in Services, 40,
WT/ACC/VCM/48/Add.2
(Oct.
27,
2006),
http://docsonline.wto.org/imrd/directdoc.asp?
DDFDocuments/t/wt/acc/vnm48a2.doc (last visited Jan. 28, 2010).
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to come. It is speculated that in the next 10 years, Vietnam is going to need
$140 billion USD to retrofit its crumbling infrastructure in order to keep up
with its growth.56 Vietnamese banks must play a central role in raising and
disseminating these funds. In order to do this, the New Banking Law must
effectively modernize Vietnamese banks to efficiently and effectively serve
this function while further enticing foreign investment.
An important element to modernizing Vietnam’s banks is providing
bank managers with the opportunity to adapt to the dynamic conditions of
the market. Chapter III of the New Banking Law entitled “General
Management Principles” lays the guidelines for who can serve in a
Vietnamese bank.57 Although the responsibilities of the different managerial
positions remain the same, the requirements of who can serve in such
positions have changed.58 According to the State Bank, the previous banking
law “has demonstrated a number of weaknesses during its time, not least of
which is the lack of detail regarding the qualifications, duties and
responsibilities of general directors or members of bank boards and audit
committees.”59 The New Banking Law therefore attempts to address these
issues. In the process, however, several new problems emerge.
III.

THE NEW BANKING LAW ALLOWS THE GOVERNMENT MORE CONTROL
IN REMOVING MANAGERS FROM OFFICE BY INTRODUCING STRICTER
MANAGEMENT REQUIREMENTS AND BY ENHANCING RELIANCE ON THE
PROBLEMATIC CRIMINAL LEGAL INFRASTRUCTURE

First, the New Banking Law provides the government more control in
removing managers from their positions by introducing stricter regulations
on the qualifications of managers and more prohibitions against managers
than the Law on Credit Institutions and the Enterprise Law. Second, the
New Law’s enhanced reliance on loopholes within the Penal Code and
Criminal Procedure Code makes it easy for the government to arbitrarily
remove managers from office. This section explores these two problems
with the New Banking Law.
56
Vietnam Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vietnam Infrastructure Funds Debuts,
http://www.mofa.gov.vn/mofa/en/nr040807104143/nr040807105039/ns070815101124 (last visited Dec.
29, 2009).
57
New Law on the Organization and Operation of Commercial Banks, 2009, 59/2009/ND-CP, ch. III
(Viet.).
58
New Law on the Organization and Operation of Commercial Banks, 2009, 59/2009/ND-CP, ch.
III, sec. 2 (Viet.).
59
Do Commercial Banks Really Need Temporary Regulation?, VILAF HONG DUC LAW FIRM, Jan.
31,
2008,
http://vilaf.com.vn/index.asp?progid=50005&docID=898D361B-6E68-6152-0D0FA31354D75722 (last visited June 12, 2009).
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The New Banking Law Provides the Government with More Control
Over Management than the Law on Credit Institutions and the
Enterprise Law

This section compares the New Banking Law with the Law on Credit
Institutions and Enterprise Law to examine how the New Banking Law has
expanded restrictions for managers, while simultaneously heightening
requirements to serve as a manager.
1.

The New Banking Law is Stricter than the Law on Credit Institutions
When it Comes to Criminal Investigations, Previous Bankruptcies,
and Suspensions

The Law on Credit Institutions was drafted with the intent to create a
level playing field and prevent preferential treatment. The New Banking
Law, on the other hand, vests significantly more control of a company in the
hands of the state. While the Law on Credit Institutions prohibits a manager
under criminal investigation from serving in a bank, the New Banking Law
expands this requirement to a greater number of positions. 60 The New
Banking Law also prohibits those who have served on boards of bankrupt
companies and those who have been suspended from previous positions by
the State Bank, from serving as managers.61 Thus, under the New Banking
Law, criminal investigations and bankruptcy are all situations that can
severely affect one’s ability to manage a bank. These situations, as will be
demonstrated, are within the power of the state to create, leading to a
potentially dangerous position for bank managers.
a.

According to the New Banking Law, Criminal Investigations, Even
When Based on Fraudulent Claims, Can Lead to a Manager’s
Removal

Although both the New Banking Law and the Law on Credit
Institutions prohibit those under “criminal prosecution” from serving in a
bank, the New Banking Law extends such a prohibition to more positions.62
According to Article 40 of the Law on Credit Institutions, the members of
the managing board, the control board, and executive officers cannot serve if
60
New Law on the Organization and Operation of Commercial Banks, 2009, 59/2009/ND-CP, art
19, pts. 1, 2 (Viet.).
61
New Law on the Organization and Operation of Commercial Banks, 2009, 59/2009/ND-CP, art.
19(2)(b) (Viet.).
62
Id. art. 19, pt. 2.
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they are under investigation for penal liability. 63 The Law on Credit
Institutions does not make clear whether those under investigation are
suspended until exonerated. This can lead to problems if fraudulent criminal
claims are lodged against individuals.
For example, in the Andersen case, Laking endured criminal
investigations for over four years.64 Laking was released on bail in January
2005 and was under house arrest until his trial, which as of June 2007, was
not set.65 During his time in prison and under house arrest, Laking was
forced to suspend all business activities.66 Lack of evidence, plus the fact
that a parallel case was dismissed in British courts, should have provided
evidence that a fraudulent claim was filed.67 Regardless, Vietnamese courts
still deprived Laking of the ability to serve as a manager, and even the most
basic rights of leaving his home or seeking employment elsewhere.68
The New Banking Law extends this problematic aspect of the Law on
Credit Institutions to apply to more managers. The New Banking Law
extends the same requirements to the Chief Accountant, Director of the
Operation Center, Manager of a Branch, and Director of a subsidiary
company of the bank. 69 As seen in the Andersen case, “criminal
prosecution” included years of criminal investigation and probation.
According to the Vietnamese Penal Code, during a probationary period the
sentenced persons must not leave their governmentally designated residence
and are deprived of a number of civic rights. 70 They are banned from
practicing certain occupations or doing certain jobs. Probationary periods
can range from one year to five years from the date an imprisonment penalty
is completely served. 71 Needless to say, criminal investigations and
probationary periods can be a severe burden for managers. Not only can
they lead to one’s removal from office, as was seen in the Andersen case, if
questionable charges are brought, one can be kept on probation until a case
is established. In Laking’s case, four years after charges were brought, he is
still on probation waiting for the prosecutors to present their case.

63

Law on Credit Institutions, 1997, No. 02/1997/QH10 art. 40, pt. 1 (Viet.) (amended 2004).
Fair Trials International, supra note 2.
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
Hannan, supra note 6..
68
Vietnam Penal Code, 1999, art. 38 (Viet.), available at http://www.worldlii.org/vn/legis/pc66/.
69
New Law on the Organization and Operation of Commercial Banks, 2009, 59/2009/ND-CP, art
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The New Banking Law Expands Restrictive Prohibitions on Those
Who Have Served in Bankrupt Companies to Even More Positions
than the Law on Credit Institutions

The New Banking Law expands similar restrictive provisions found in
the Law on Credit Institutions regarding those who served in bankrupt
companies. The Law on Credit Institutions prohibits former members of the
managing board and former general directors of bankrupt companies to
serve as members of the managing board, the control board, and as executive
officers in the future.72 The New Banking Law expands this restriction to
partners in the company, council members, control commissioners, and
members of the management of cooperatives and their chair.73 The New
Banking Law also specifically mentions head and members of the managing
board, while the Law on Credit Institutions does not.74
The New Banking Law makes no distinction between those who are
to blame for the bankruptcy and those who merely served on a board for a
company that went bankrupt. Furthermore, in business, bankruptcies are
inevitable and are sometimes used in desperate situations as a deliberate
strategy to reorganize. 75 The New Banking Law therefore prohibits
managers who were unfortunate to serve on a board for a business that either
went bankrupt, regardless of the manager’s own culpability, or went
bankrupt as a result from an established business plan meant to reorganize
the organization.
c.

Under the New Banking Law, the Government Has Far More Control
Over the Suspension and Subsequent Removal of Managers from
Office than the Law on Credit Institutions

The New Banking Law creates new restrictive provisions that are not
found in the Law on Credit Institutions. The New Banking Law prohibits
those who have been temporarily suspended from their positions by the State
Bank from serving as chairman of the board of directors, members of the
board of directors, chief of the control committee, members of the control
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73

APRIL 2010

BANK PRIVATIZATION IN VIETNAM

343

committee, or the general manager.76 Temporary suspension is guided by
Article 25 of the New Banking Law, which grants expansive control to the
state regarding such suspensions. Article 25 allows the State Bank to
permanently or temporarily suspend the chairman and members of board of
directors, chief and members of control, and director general in banks that
are under “special control” of the government if they violate laws found in
Article 20 of the New Banking Law.77 “Special control” according to the
New Banking Law is when a company is in danger of losing its ability to
maintain solvency and pay its customers, and is therefore, placed under the
control of the State Bank.78
Given the fact that creating “special control” over a company is
completely up to the State Bank, this can lead to problems. Since “special
control” is when a company is in any danger of losing its ability to maintain
solvency and pay off its customers, a company’s financial stability is
important. However, assessing a company’s financial stability has been a
problem, especially when it comes to whether the company is capable of
paying off its loans from the government.79 According to some reports, the
State Bank has non-performing loans under control and 4.7% of such loans
are outstanding. 80 However, the true level of non-performing and underperforming loans in Vietnam's financial system is difficult to gauge due to
the enduring lack of transparency and poor public disclosure.81 Therefore,
the State Bank has wide discretion to administer “special control” over some
businesses, while leaving others alone.
2.

The New Banking Law is Stricter than the Enterprise Law When it
comes to Criminal Investigations, Bankruptcy, and Required
Qualifications

The Enterprise Law was created with the intent to protect businesses
from government intervention. 82 It does this by removing burdensome
government regulations that restrict Vietnamese business operations.83 The
76
New Law on the Organization and Operation of Commercial Banks, 2009, 59/2009/ND-CP, art.
19(2)(d) (Viet.).
77
Id. art. 25(1)(2)(3)(4).
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Id. ch. 5.
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Hoang Tien Loi, An Update on Non-Performing Loans Resolution and Banking Reform in Viet
Nam, in ASIAN INSOLVENCY SYSTEMS: CLOSING THE IMPLEMENTATION GAP 139 (2007).
80
Id.
81
Karl D John, Vietnam’s Banks: A Wild New World, ASIA TIMES ONLINE, Apr. 19, 2006.
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/HD19Ae03.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2010).
82
See Law on Enterprises, 2005, No. 60/2005/QH11, arts. 1, 5 (Viet.).
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New Banking Law departs from this approach and offers different
requirements for those who have engaged in criminal activities and for those
who have served in bankrupt companies. 84 The Enterprise Law also
provides for less rigid education and experience requirements for those
serving in banks compared to the New Banking Law.85 The New Banking
Law therefore reintroduces burdensome government regulations that the
Enterprise Law attempted to remove.
a.

The New Banking Law’s Significantly Stricter Provisions Concerning
Criminal Investigations Create Confusion as to Which Law Should
Apply

While the Law on Credit Institutions and the New Banking Law
prohibit those who are under penal investigation from serving in certain
managerial positions, the Enterprise Law does not. Article 13(2)(e) of the
Enterprise Law only restricts persons who are serving an imprisoned
punishment or prohibited by the court from managing an enterprise.86 Thus
the Enterprise Law is less restrictive than both laws when it comes to
criminal investigations. Only those who are convicted of a crime and
physically incarcerated cannot serve. Furthermore, according to the
Enterprise Law, theoretically, one may be incarcerated and still manage an
enterprise if allowed to do so by the court.87 This is less strict than the Law
on Credit Institutions’ prohibition against those who are under criminal
investigation and the New Banking Law’s extension of this prohibition to
more managerial positions.88
The significantly stricter provisions of the New Banking Law create
confusion as to which laws should apply. Borderline institutions that only
lend or transfer funds may inadvertently be included in the category with
more restrictive provisions. Furthermore, those who have operated under
the more relaxed provisions of the Enterprise Law may be in jeopardy now
that the stricter provisions of the New Banking Law may apply. Although
criminal investigations are serious and should cause suspicion regarding a
manager’s ability to run a business, when the Criminal Code is ambiguous

84
New Law on the Organization and Operation of Commercial Banks, 2009, 59/2009/ND-CP, art.
19, pts. 1, 2 (Viet.).
85
Law on Enterprises, 2005, No. 60/2005/QH11, art. 110 (Viet.).
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and the Vietnamese government, as seen in the Andersen case, can intervene
in private enterprise, such a strict provision is problematic.
b.

The New Banking Law Complicates Matters When it Creates Its Own
Guidelines on Bankruptcy as Opposed to Relying on the Law on
Bankruptcy

The Enterprise Law’s restriction on those who have served in
enterprises that have gone bankrupt from serving in similar positions in
SOEs is guided by the Law on Bankruptcy, 89 as opposed to the New
Banking Law which creates such a condition on its own.90 However, while
the Law on Bankruptcy prohibits individuals who have served in managerial
positions in bankrupt companies from serving in similar positions in nonstate owned enterprises for a period of one to three years, the New Banking
Law takes this prohibition further for some positions and neglects it for
others. According to the Law on Bankruptcy, this prohibition applies to the
owners of private enterprises, partnership members, general directors,
chairmen and members of managing boards, members’ councils, and
managers and members of the managerial boards of the cooperatives that are
declared bankrupt.91 The Law on Bankruptcy adds that these individuals
shall not be allowed to set up enterprises or cooperatives, and must not work
as managers of enterprises or cooperatives for one to three years from the
date the enterprises or cooperatives are declared bankrupt.92
The New Banking Law adopts this provision, but further stipulates
that if an individual has served in the aforementioned position, then he or
she may not serve as a chairman of the board of directors, chief of the
controllers committee, member of the controllers committee, or general
manager of the bank indefinitely. 93 Branch directors, the director of
transactions, and the director of the company’s banks are not subject to the
New Banking Law’s prohibition against those who have served in similar
positions in bankrupt companies.94 Thus, it is unclear if they are subject to
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Bankruptcy Law, 2004, No. 21/2004/QH11 (Viet.). This law prescribes bankruptcy procedures
for enterprises and cooperatives and serves as legal basis for the restoration or abolition of enterprises that
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the bankruptcy provision in the New Banking Law or if they are subject to
the rules found in the Law on Bankruptcy.
While the Enterprise Law defers to the Law on Bankruptcy, the New
Banking Law takes some provisions of the Law on Bankruptcy and
interprets them more strictly for some positions and completely ignores them
for others. Therefore, while the Enterprise Law defers to the Law on
Bankruptcy to create consistency, the New Banking Law complicates
matters by taking the issue into its own hands. Reliance on the Law on
Bankruptcy for some issues and the New Banking Law’s expanded
provisions for others makes compliance more difficult.
c.

Required Qualifications in the New Banking Law Are More Stringent
than the Enterprise Law and Provide the State with More Opportunity
to Remove Managers from Office

The New Banking Law introduces new baseline requirements, which
differ from the Enterprise Law’s simple and uniform requirements. In the
Enterprise law, required qualifications for different managerial positions are
simple and uniform. The Enterprise Law discusses the qualification
requirements for different managerial positions according to the type of
business and position. For instance, Articles 57(1)(a) and 116 require that a
director or general director in a limited liability company (LLC) with more
than one member and in a shareholding company: 1) have the capacity for
civil acts; 95 2) not be prohibited from managing an enterprise as stipulated in
the Enterprise Law;96 and 3) own ten percent or more of the charter capital
or have expertise and experience in relation to business management or
major business activities of the company. 97 Section two adds that in
companies where state-owned capital accounts for more than fifty percent of
the charter capital, related family members cannot serve as directors. 98
Members of the board of management and board of supervisors share similar
requirements to those of the director or general director. 99 Pursuant to
Article 110, members of the board of management must abide by standards
95

For a definition of a shareholding company see Law on Enterprises, 2005, No. 60/2005/QH11, ch.
IV, art. 77(1) (Viet.).
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Id. arts. 57(1)(a), 116.
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found in Article 57, except the percentage of the ownership and prohibited
positions to which a member can be related is different.100 The rest of the
positions mentioned in the Enterprise Law do not have as structured a set of
requirements as found for these positions. The baseline requirements in the
law allow banks to be more flexible in their requirements, encouraging more
investment and dynamic forms of enterprises.
The New Banking Law, on the other hand, has more explicit clauses
and new requirements. The New Banking Law, for instance, requires that
the Governor of the State Bank must approve the election or appointment of
chairman and members of the board of directors, chief and members of the
controllers committee, and general manager of the bank (except for the case
where the appointment is made by the Prime Minister). 101 Furthermore,
banks must submit the names and resumes of appointed deputy general
managers, chief accountants, directors of operation centers, manager of a
branch, and director of a subsidiary company to the State Bank.102
These requirements, although useful in creating a transparent
management apparatus, subject management appointees to the approval and
scrutiny by the state. In addition, whereas the Law on Enterprises mandates
that managers have expertise and experience, 103 the New Banking Law
discusses what this means in greater detail, creating arbitrary baselines such
as having a university degree in economics to be a general director, or
having no less than three years serving in a managerial position in a bank or
other company to serve on the board of directors.104 The New Banking Law
thus exposes managers to greater scrutiny by the state at both the entry level
and the decision making level. Although this can lead to higher standards in
management, it arguably reduces the autonomy of the manager and
arbitrarily creates obstacles.
B.

Problems with the Penal Code and Criminal Procedure Code Make it
Easy for the Government to Arbitrarily Remove a Manager from
Office

Reliance of the New Banking Law, the Enterprise Law, and the Law
on Credit Institutions on the Vietnamese Penal Code, particularly with
100
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regard to certain provisions such as those regarding “criminal prosecutions,”
highlights the much broader issue of weak procedural infrastructures. When
the New Banking Law relies on the ambiguous and problematic nature of the
Penal Code, it is argued that managers are further at risk from losing their
positions because of the potential for frivolous investigations and filing of
lawsuits. To establish this argument, this section analyzes problems in the
Penal Code and the Criminal Procedure Code and ends with a discussion of
the Andersen case, which demonstrates how such problems have played out
in the past.
1.

Ambiguous Clauses in the Penal Code Can Lead to a Manager Being
Removed from Office Under the New Banking Law

The expanded significance of criminal investigations and convictions
in the New Banking Law requires the existence of a clear and effective Penal
Code. Article 19 of the New Banking Law mandates that those who are
under criminal investigation, those who have been convicted for crimes
against national security or violating private property rights, or those who
have been convicted of serious crimes cannot serve as a member of the
board of directors, members of the control commission, the general director,
or the deputy general of the bank.105 In addition to being broad, the New
Banking Law poorly defines these potential grounds for removal. The New
Banking Law also relies on the criminal system’s ability to investigate
carefully, since an investigation alone may lead to the loss of one’s position
in a company.106
Launching a criminal investigation on the basis of a legal claim in
Vietnam is easy because the Penal Code is written broadly and ambiguously.
According to Article 8 of the Penal Code, a crime is an act dangerous to
society.107 Such acts can be committed intentionally or unintentionally by a
person having a capacity for penal liability.108 Penal liability can be found
when an actor infringes upon the independence, sovereignty, unity, and
territorial integrity of the nation. 109 Furthermore, penal liability is also
present when an actor infringes upon the political regime, the economic
105
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regime, culture, defense, security, social order and safety, or the legitimate
rights and interests of organizations. 110 Infringing upon the life, health,
honor, dignity, freedom, property, as well as other legitimate rights and
interests of citizens may also lead to penal liability.111 Finally, the code adds
that infringing upon other socialist legislation may also be considered a
penal violation. 112 These broad crime definitions enable any act to be
deemed worthy of investigation. Furthermore, because many of these
crimes can be committed either intentionally or unintentionally, the subject
of the investigation may be completely unaware of his or her liability until
the lawsuit is initiated.
2.

Due Process Violations Allowed by a Weak Criminal Procedure Code
Can Facilitate the Initiation of a Frivolous Lawsuit

The Criminal Procedure Code also facilitates the initiation of
frivolous lawsuits. According to Article 164, the party initiating the lawsuit
must provide names and addresses of parties, the litigator, date of filing,
name of court, and documents and evidence to prove that the lawsuit is well
grounded, in addition to the signature and fingerprints of the litigator. 113
While stating a claim is facilitated by the ambiguity found in the Penal
Code, certain loopholes in the Criminal Procedure Code can also lead to the
filing of a lawsuit despite a weak legal claim.
Although Article 165 mandates that litigators accompany their lawsuit
petitions with documents and or evidence to prove their claims are well
grounded, what is deemed admissible is also problematic. 114 Documents
strictly under the control of the government are sufficient for admission and
serve as the basis for a legal claim.115 Nicholson argues this is problematic
because judicial independence in Vietnam is severely limited and courts are
intrinsically connected to the Communist Party.116 Therefore, it is easy for
the government to file claims against a manager to have her removed from
her position based on evidence within the exclusive domain of the state.
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Government Control Over Management Through Faulty Criminal
Procedure and Penal Codes Can Be Seen in the Andersen Case

The case of Andersen, as mentioned in the introduction, demonstrates
how Vietnam’s poorly drafted criminal procedure laws can lead to one’s
removal from a management position. In this case, ambiguity within the
Criminal Procedure and Penal Codes created significant problems with due
process, making it very difficult for the foreign manager to assert a defense
and very easy for the state to remove him from his managerial position in a
multinational corporation. Although not based on the New Banking Law,
this case demonstrates how existing laws in the Law on Credit Institutions
and Enterprise Law have led to frivolous lawsuits and managers being
removed from office. More cases such as Andersen’s will probably follow,
given the New Banking Law’s expanded reliance on the Penal and Criminal
Procedure Codes.
Andersen’s case demonstrates how easy it is for the state or a
disgruntled investor to file a lawsuit despite a lack of evidence. To date, it is
questionable whether or not the two Irishmen lodged a valid complaint
against Laking and McCormack.117 Although British courts had dropped the
case for lack of evidence, Vietnamese courts continued to investigate for
months, leading to an eventual incarceration of Andersen, Hong, Laking, and
McCormack.118 As of June 2007, Laking, one of the founding members and
principal defendants, is still awaiting trial while prosecutors continue to
search for evidence to support their charges. 119 On the other hand,
Andersen’s case was not expedited until the Danish Foreign Minister raised
the issue of Andersen’s dire jail conditions and delayed trial date during an
October 2004 meeting with the Vietnamese Foreign Minister.120 Meanwhile,
in the United Kingdom on November 5, 2008, the two Irishmen finally
settled long-running property disputes, which include the assets for which
Laking, McCormack, Andersen, and Hong were incarcerated.121 Thus, while
British courts dismiss cases for lack of evidence and British newspapers
acknowledge the suspicious actions of wealthy businessmen taking on their
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competitors in court,122 Vietnamese courts continue to investigate and detain
defendants.123
This case also demonstrates how difficult it is for parties to assert a
defense. While incarcerated, when Andersen was able to receive visitors,
the visitors were only allowed twenty minutes and were forced to speak in
English in order for the guards to understand the content of their
communication.124 The case was not to be discussed and everything said
was translated into Vietnamese while heavily armed policemen watched the
visits intently. 125 After sixteen months of waiting, Andersen had the
opportunity to plead his case in front of a judge and in the presence of his
lawyers, the Danish ambassador, and members of the Danish press. 126
During trial however, Andersen’s interpreters spoke broken and incompetent
English, prompting protests from both the Danish ambassador and his
British colleague.127 As for Laking, he did not have any access to a lawyer
for a period of four months.128 He was not allowed to communicate with his
lawyer in private, nor was his right for privileged correspondence with his
lawyer upheld, while claimants were allowed to intimidate him on four
occasions during his imprisonment. 129 During trial, the interpreters were
supplied by the legal representatives of the claimants and were deeply
biased.130
IV.

PROBLEMS IN THE NEW BANKING LAW CAN BE RESOLVED BY RELYING
ON CERTAIN EXISTING LAWS WHILE UPGRADING OTHERS

This section argues that despite its problems, the New Banking Law is
a step in the right direction. Although evidence has shown that the
government is willing to intervene in management, all is not lost. Problems
found in the banking law can be resolved by focusing on existing laws such
as the Enterprise Law and the Bankruptcy Law. Furthermore, by critically
reviewing loopholes in the Penal and Criminal Procedure Codes,
management rights, and civil rights in general, can improve.

122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130

Id.
See Fair Trials International, supra note 2.
Carlsen, supra note 120.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Fair Trials International, supra note 2.
Id.
Id.

352

PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL

A.

VOL. 19 NO. 2

The New Banking Law Should Rely on Updated Laws Such as the Law
on Enterprises

To remedy problems with the new banking law, the Vietnamese
government can rely on the management requirements in the Law on
Enterprises. Managers under this law are only required to act in the best
interest of the company, 131 providing much leeway for managers to
experiment and expand their businesses. They are also not bogged down by
the formal requirements of the New Banking Law that require a baseline of
education in order to serve as a manager.132
Results of the broad management requirements under the Enterprise
Law are astonishing. Under the Enterprise Law, private enterprise in
Vietnam has flourished. The law was enacted in 1999, and from 2000 to
2005, more than 180,000 enterprises were established, and dozens of
existing enterprises expanded their activities.133 These enterprises created
one million new jobs each year and dramatically diversified the nation’s
industrial and agricultural capacity, boosted exports, and enhanced products
offered by the services industry.134
B.

The New Banking Law Should Rely on the Bankruptcy Law as
Opposed to Creating its Own Provisions on Bankruptcy

While the Enterprise Law and the Law on Credit Institutions both
defer to the Law on Bankruptcy to create consistency,135 the New Banking
Law on the other hand complicates matters by creating its own provisions on
the issue.136 The New Banking Law takes some provisions of the Law on
Bankruptcy and interprets them more strictly for some positions and
completely ignores them for others.137 Although the Bankruptcy Law has
131
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many problems of its own, more consistency results when all three laws rely
on its provisions. One commentator found inconsistency in a similar
situation for instance when the Bankruptcy Law did not apply to small-scale
enterprises. 138 Because small-scale enterprises relied on the Civil Code,
which until recently had not been amended to refer to the Bankruptcy Law,
small-scale enterprises were able to escape bankruptcy, while larger
enterprises registered under the Law on Enterprises went bankrupt. 139
Second, the Bankruptcy Law provides a clear definition of bankruptcy, the
categories of persons having the right to file bankruptcy petitions, and
sanctions and additional restrictions for directors, board members, owners of
bankrupt businesses, etc.140 Many of these provisions may either be missing
or conflicted out if drawn up independently in the New Banking Law. Thus,
in addition to relying on management principles of the Enterprise Law, the
New Banking Law should refer to the Bankruptcy Law, as opposed to
attempting to create its own provisions on the topic.
C.

By Strengthening the Rights of the Accused, Civil Rights and the
Rights of Managers Will Improve

Lastly, by strengthening the rights of the accused, management rights
and civil rights will improve. In order to do this, the Vietnamese
government should revise the Penal and Criminal Procedure Codes.
Although Vietnam has been a party to the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights since 1982, peaceful government critics have been
charged with “abusing democratic freedoms to infringe upon the interests of
the State.”141 Despite implementing wide-reaching economic reforms such
as the new banking law, Vietnam is still a monolithic one-party state and its
citizens are often denied basic civil liberties.142 Cases such as Andersen may
become more prolific if Vietnam continues to rely on its ambiguous and
faulty Penal and Criminal Procedure Code provisions.
Amnesty
International has urged the Vietnamese government to repeal or amend
provisions in the 1999 Penal Code to ensure that ambiguous provisions
138
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relating to national security are clearly defined or removed, so they cannot
be applied in an arbitrary manner.143 Such amendments can not only affect
an individual’s civil and political rights, but economic rights as well, since
the same provisions used to crack down on dissidents can be used by the
government to crack down on unruly managers, as seen in the new banking
law.
V.

CONCLUSION

Vietnam is currently privatizing its state-owned banks to meet the
growing internal demand for efficient financial and credit services and to
fulfill its international obligations. The New Banking Law represents a big
step forward in Vietnam’s equitization campaigns. The New Banking Law
provides guidance on how equitized banks shall be managed. It is also far
more sophisticated, as it expands aspects of the previous law that were
previously vague.
In its expansion however, the New Banking Law has introduced a
whole new set of problems. First, the law conflicts with the existing legal
infrastructure regarding banks. In its attempts to bring banking management
requirements in line with existing laws, it has gone so far as to expand and
increase the requirements, which unnecessarily puts management at risk of
losing their positions. Second, although the New Banking Law arguably
addresses weaknesses in the previous law, loopholes in the legal
infrastructure make it so that the government can intervene and strip an
individual of rights normally afforded elsewhere—a troubling sign when
management requirements and restrictions are increased. Last, increasing
requirements, and evidence of a swift and unforgiving government, are not
conducive to inspiring investor confidence, or recruiting international talent
to help modernize or professionalize state-owned banks. These facts reveal
a government that goes to extreme lengths to protect its interests, not one
interested in standing behind the decisions of its banks and their managers.
Vietnam has proven to be aggressive and driven when it comes to
economic growth. Equitizing its state-owned bank is a huge step in
modernizing its economy. However, the New Banking Law serves as an
example of the nation’s attempt to release control over its state-owned banks
while preserving avenues for intervention when necessary. Such attempts to
maintain control can be self-destructive when the heavy hand of government
strangles the already limited channels for private investment and
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development. However, existing legislation such as the Enterprise Law
proves that Vietnam is capable of releasing control and allowing more
freedom and autonomy to managers. Changes to banking laws make no
difference, however, if problematic provisions in the Penal and Criminal
Procedure Codes continue to provide the government with expansive
authority to intervene in private enterprise.
Relaxing management
regulations while shoring up civil liberties will greatly enhance government
attempts to modernize the country’s banking industry.

